Preface
In the three years since General John Jumper initiated the Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) concept at Headquarters Central Command Air Forces (CENTAF) the expeditionary mindset has come to dominate current thoughts on the employment of air power. The volume of material written on AEF operations and proposed doctrine has been torrential and reflects the challenge I faced in writing this paper. Throughout the research phase of this project, I found that a specific thesis I intended to pursue had been "overcome by events" due to research at RAND or by a corporate Air Force organizational decision. This observation is meant in a positive light as it indicates the effort and priority the Air Force has placed in implementing the expeditionary approach. 
Abstract
Contrary to initial expectations, the end of the Cold War has not resulted in a spontaneous outbreak of international peace and stability. While the nuclear threat has diminished, previously suppressed ethnic and nationalistic rivalries have boiled over and become additive to existing trouble spots in Korea and Southwest Asia. In spite of these challenges, defense spending and military forward presence have declined as the lack of a peer competitor has our deprived national security strategy of a definable threat.
The Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) is an attempt to deal with the uncertainty of the current volatile world by improving the responsiveness of airpower. However, in terms of future security challenges, the AEF focus appears to be too narrow. Although current planning AEF operations in response to a major theater of war, the most probable use of an AEF will most in a non-combat role supporting humanitarian or peacekeeping operations. In both types of AEFs, the personnel and leadership skills, as well as composition of this type of AEF will be markedly different than a combat style AEF. This paper begins by reviewing the international and domestic context that has caused the Air Force to focus on expeditionary operations. It then discusses the historical roots of the AEF and the current AEF employment philosophy. The paper concludes by identifying courses of action that should keep the AEF viable in an uncertain international environment.
Introduction
Contrary to predictions, the end of the Cold War has not produced a stable international order or a dramatic reduction in the requirement for military forces. While the specter of global nuclear war has greatly diminished, it has been replaced by a host of regional, ethnic, and nationalistic conflicts.
In former republics and satellite nations of the now defunct Soviet Union, the United States military plays a key role in ensuring regional stability. Renewed ethnic violence between the republics of Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia in the former nation of Yugoslavia has resulted in a United Nations mandated peacekeeping force with the United States military playing a principal role. Under Project Sapphire United States military forces are directly involved in the removal of fissile material from former Soviet republics to preclude them from falling into the wrong hands. 1 At the same time, national leaders draw upon military expertise and equipment to provide relief for natural disasters and humanitarian undertakings.
These "impromptu" deployments are additive to regional tensions remaining from past conflicts in Korea and Southwest Asia. Having lost the economic backing of its former patron and gripped by a deadly famine, United States forces maintain a watch on a North Korean society about to implode. Almost eight years after the end of the Gulf War, the United States continues to enforce United Nations sanctions against Iraq and Saddam Hussein. In these trouble spots, North Korea has produced, and Iraq is attempting to produce, a nuclear weapon. The Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) represents the Air Force's strategy to adjust to the ambiguous post-Cold War environment, a declining defense budget, and reduced forward presence. The AEF capitalizes on the superior mobility, range, and lethality of air power. It provides regional CINCs with tailored force packages that can rapidly deploy to conduct operations ranging from presence to the employment of air power against a hostile force.
Toward this goal, AEF literature is heavily weighted to responding to conventional state-to-state aggression. Within this concept, the emphasis has been on the deployment of airpower to conduct a halt phase style operation against an aggressor nation.
However, the demise of the Soviet Union and our recent performance in the Gulf War downplays the potential of this type of action. The United States does not currently face a peer competitor and, according to estimates, will most likely not face one until after 2010. 3 Further, the overwhelming performance of United States forces during Desert Storm will cause most adversaries to avoid challenging the United States in a conventional land war. As a result, air power may be used in those areas short of war, also known as military operations other than war (MOOTW).
The purpose of this research report is look at the direction of AEF development and make recommendations as to how it might be better postured to handle future challenges. The paper will start by reviewing how the international climate has changed since the end of the Cold War.
Next, we'll review the combat-style AEF from both historical and current perspectives. As will be seen, the AEF has many parallels with a Cold War counterpart known as the Composite Air Strike Force (CASF).
After reviewing the combat-oriented AEF, the paper will discuss the humanitarian AEF.
Like the combat AEF, the humanitarian AEF is designed to provide the theater CINC with a rapid, responsive, and reliable force to confront humanitarian missions. However, the humanitarian AEF has not received the same level of attention as the combat style AEF. As will be shown this is unfortunate since the humanitarian AEF may be the most called upon AEF variant. Finally, the paper will make some recommendations to enhance the effectiveness of the AEF in an ambiguous future. 
International Environment
The end of the Cold War complicated world events to an unexpected degree.
Despite the terror of global nuclear war, the Cold War era of 1946 to 1991 was actually one of relative calm. During this period, nations found themselves divided into three basic camps: those countries aligned with the "free world" ideals of the United States, those aligned with the Soviet Union and its concept of world socialism, and a smattering of non-aligned countries who attempted to walk the tightrope between the two super powers. Within this framework of ideologies, nations conducted international trade while the United States and Soviet Union jockeyed for hegemony over their respective spheres of influence.
While relations between the "free world" and "socialist" camps oscillated at times between imminent hostility (i.e., Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962) to fairly cordial relations (i.e. period of détente during the Nixon Administration), the world as a whole was predominantly stable. Periods of conflict normally involved only one superpower in a direct role while competing superpowers supported the opposing side. The continued economic problems of former Soviet Republics brings with it two concerns.
One is that financially strapped and unscrupulous military personnel may attempt to sell one or more of these weapons to parties hostile to United States or its allies. The second concern is one of proliferation of knowledge. Unemployed scientists of the Soviet Union's NBC design and production industry are looking for work and nations eager to develop their own nuclear, biological, or ballistic missile capability are willing to pay. In either case, the consequences of a weapon of mass destruction in the hands of a terrorist are of considerable consequence. Internationally, humanitarian and MOOTW missions are the beginning of a shift in security challenges. The 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) attempts to provide a roadmap of where the defense establishment needs to go in its strategy and modernization to meet these challenges. The QDR recognizes the fact that while the Cold War is over and the United States has no peer competitor, there are a variety of regional dangers security challenges the United States will face between now and 2015. Despite these challenges, the American public continues to remain apathetic to the military. The decline in defense spending and desire to reduce a fixed forward presence reflect an attitude that we "won" the Cold War and there are no direct threats to our security.
It is within these challenges that the AEF was born. The AEF is an attempt to balance reductions in force structure and forward presence with the ambiguity of the post-Cold War world by capitalizing on the attributes of airpower to quickly and precisely provide air power anywhere in the world. However, as we'll see, the AEF concept is strongly rooted in Cold War history. The purpose of the AEF is to give regional Commanders in Chief (CINCs) an air power package that is tailorable to the task at hand and, most importantly, rapid, responsive, and reliable. In the current incarnation of the AEF, tasked units are expected to prepare (generate) aircraft, deploy, and launch combat sorties in-theater within fortyeight hours after an "Execute Order" is given. Further, with resupply, the AEF must sustain combat operations for the duration of the conflict or crisis. There are two reasons for this emphasis on the Southwest Asia. First, the continuing requirement for forces in Southwest Asia has produced an operations tempo problem for combat units in ACC who receive the bulk of these taskings. ACC wants to improve the rapid reaction capability of the AEF with the goal of reducing our forward presence.
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Second, deployments have helped bolster our presence in the region during periods of increased tensions with Iraq. The deployments have also demonstrated an increasing ability to achieve the goal of "bombs on target" within forty-eight hours of tasking.
As the AEF concept has evolved, it has grown to include a scheduling aspect. In an effort to inculcate an Expeditionary Air Force mindset in the Air Force and to address the operational pace (ops tempo), the Air Force is organizing around ten AEF wings. Two of these wings will be placed on a modified alert status for a three-month period. In the event of a contingency these "alert" units would be the first to deploy. 3 As mentioned previously, the size and composition of an AEF is dictated by the assigned task. An AEF designed to halt an armored advance would look remarkably different than one designed to support a humanitarian operation. Initial AEFs supporting
Operation Southern Watch were designed to provide precision guided munitions delivery, air superiority, and suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) capabilities. Originally consisting of 30 aircraft, these AEFs have been expanded to include tanker aircraft as well as B-52 and B-1 bombers. The more recent evolution of the AEF now includes elements of high-demand, low-density assets such as the E-3 AWACS, U-2, and E-8 JSTARS.
Despite the mobile nature inherent in airpower, numerous constraints must be resolved before deploying an AEF. Among these are access to the host country, airfield infrastructure, airlift availability, and munitions. 4 Host nation access is the most constraining requisite for any AEF deployment.
While most nations will accede to the deployment of air power to their country in a crisis situation, there may be situations where the host nation may not view the threat to United
States interests with the same sense of urgency.
In a similar vein, overflight of, and landing rights at, enroute nations also play into the speed or ability of the AEF to deploy. While the AEF is a rapid reaction endeavor, many countries require advanced notification to obtain "diplomatic clearances" for overflight. Further, some principal mobility bases, like RAF Mildenhall, routinely observe "quiet hours" or reduced operating periods. 5 These restrictions decrease the speed and/or throughput of the mobility effort.
Due to deployment timelines, a combat AEF requires a modicum of existing support and infrastructure to support air operations. As a minimum, AEFs require access to an adequate weight-bearing runway, ample ramp space to park deployed aircraft, room for a tent city or billeting, and access to fuel and water. The parking requirements for fighter aircraft must be great enough to permit safe separation of weapons loaded fighter aircraft to preclude "sympathetic detonation" of munitions on adjacent aircraft in the event of a weapons mishap. Granted, distance requirements may be waived or eased, but this can only be done with the increased risk of a catastrophic accident. Further, strategic airlift aircraft must have sufficient space to offload materiel and to preclude ramp closure in the event an airlifter breaks after landing. The ramp space issue usually becomes one of the main constraints in airfield selection. While there are many runways with adequate runway and weight bearing capacity, most airports in third world regions do not have the ramp space available to accommodate parking for an AEF-sized force.
Aside from infrastructure concerns, deploying Air Force wings still rely on a heavy footprint of prepositioned materiel, equipment, and facilities at the forward operating location. Aircraft tugs (towing equipment), munitions trailers, and aerospace ground equipment such as power carts, fuel trucks, and cryogenic carts are all indispensable to sustained combat operations. They are also bulky and heavy, consuming valuable space on airlift assets. Other safety items such as mobile aircraft arresting systems and crash/fire/rescue trucks can be delayed or dispensed with in emergency situations, but only at the cost of increased risk to aircrews and aircraft. 6 Perhaps the most challenging aspect of the AEF is the logistics tail associated with sustained operations. Currently AEF units are expected to arrive at their forward operating base prepared to conduct operations for three to seven days. 7 Theater or strategic airlift assets that are already heavily tasked under competing contingency plans must cover the time between Deployment Day 3 (D+3) and D+30. After D+30, sealift assets should begin to arrive in theater.
A quick calculation of munition requirements for a Southwest Asia (SWA) AEF provides an illuminating example of the magnitude of the munitions sustainment effort. munitions will require either one C-5 or 2 C-17s to load it. 9 In short, munitions support will be the long pole in any combat type AEF.
For the present time, prepositioning of munitions in regional or theater stockpiles remains a feasible option. There are adequate munitions prepositioned to support current operations in Southwest Asia, Korea, and Bosnia (Italy). To offset logistics problems, the Scientific Advisory Board has recommended that the Air Force establish regional Control Centers (RCCs) within 1500 to 2000 miles of potential trouble spots. In addition, they propose setting up two "super" RCCs in Spain and Diego Garcia. The idea is that RCCs should be close enough to be supported by in-theater C-130 or C-17 assets. 10 Aside from munitions, the main challenge to the AEF will remain the availability of tanker and airlift assets. Airlift assets, in particular, have not received the attention they warrant. C-141 aircraft have decreased from an inventory of approximately 400 to a current level of 161. 11 By 2006 the last C-141 will exit the inventory. In its place will be the highly capable C-17, of which the Air Force only intends to purchase 120. While the C-17 has 2.5 times the capacity of the C-141, the total available lift is still less than the original C-141 fleet.
Despite these issues, the combat oriented AEF represents a pragmatic response to conflicts in major theaters for the foreseeable future. Lacking a peer competitor for the foreseeable future, and with three mature theaters in republics of the former Yugoslavia (Bosnia), Korea and Southwest Asia, the AEF provides theater CINCs with an airpower capability that is timely and responsive. It is of value in deploying to a theater where adequate provisions have made to rapidly beddown forces and where bulky items such as munitions are prepositioned.
The AEF, however, is not as adaptable to an immature theater where necessary infrastructure is lacking if the requisite 48-hour timeline is to be maintained. Absent the ability to preposition some assets near the deployment base, deploying units will be forced to bring the materials with them at the expense of additional airlift and time.
Fortunately, many of the deployability issues of the AEF are being addressed. The development of small, "smart" bombs that retain the firepower effects of current munitions with a 60% reduction in weight will reduce lift requirements. A mini "tent city" for 1100 personnel that previously required 24 C-141 loads is moving to 8 loads, while electronic tags and scanners improve the ability to precisely track the movement of cargo through the logistics pipeline.
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However, as theater ballistic missiles continue to proliferate, forward-deployed forces like the AEF offer an increasingly lucrative and attainable target. Lacking a viable theater ballistic missile capability, the introduction of an AEF type force may have to be coincident with an attack on the enemy's ability to threaten our forces. In this regard, long range, heavy payload bomber assets on global strike type missions might provide the initial punch necessary to keep an adversary's head down while an AEF arrives in theater and begins to generate combat sorties.
As can be seen, the combat AEF provides a credible response for a mature theater.
While there are still unresolved issues, the Air Force is working hard to address these issues. Unfortunately, this emphasis seems to be lacking in the humanitarian version of the AEF. 7 This figure is from two sources. The first figure if three days sustainment is based on the author's work on the AEF while assigned to HQ CENTAF/DOXP. The seven day figure is from a November 1997 Scientific Advisory Board study on USAF Expeditionary Forces. 8 According to unpublished notes from AEF I, a sortie rate of 2.5 sorties per day per aircraft was used for planning. 9 Fuchs, Vol 1, p. 41 10 Ibid., p. Joint and service doctrinal publications recognize a number of military operations short of war. While some of them such as strikes, raids, and the evacuation of noncombatants lend themselves to the previously described combat-oriented AEF concept, the majority of current military operations require a unique set of skills and a differently tailored force structure, strategy and training. However, current AEF literature pays scant attention to the AEF's use in non-traditional military operations. This is unfortunate, as employment of military aerospace forces will be most likely in support of non-traditional military operations.
Notes

Differences between a combat and non-combat, or humanitarian, AEF begin in the planning phase. In a combat oriented AEF, the most probable threat can be discerned before hostilities begin and the force package can be tailored appropriately. In addition, since the AEF must operate out of an established base in a host country in order to meet the combat sortie timeline requirements, theater commanders can identify deployment locations before they are required. 2 Humanitarian or non-combat AEFs are the antithesis of this notion. Humanitarian AEFs usually strike with little warning and run the gamut from famine to natural disaster.
As such, the design of a humanitarian AEF force may be more of an ad hoc process based on the scale of the contingency and the ability of the affected region to absorb aid due to limited or damage infrastructure. Further, deployment locations can only be roughly guessed at. Even then, the infrastructure for airlift and operations may be degraded or non-functioning. In addition, MOOTWs normally involve civil engineers, medical, and airlift elements to a much larger scale than seen in a conventional combat AEF. Finally, while combat oriented AEFs are quick reaction events to preserve initiative and demonstrate resolve, humanitarian or peacekeeping AEFs do not necessarily have the same timeline requirements.
After forces arrive in theater, on scene commanders face different worlds. A combat AEF commander will normally receive direction through traditional chains of command and interact with familiar allies and or military organizations. The combat AEF commander is also focused on a mission he is comfortable with.
Conversely, the humanitarian AEF commander may be working as part of a coalition of nations with which he has never worked, or be operating under the aegis of the United Nations. As a result, the leadership and managerial skills of on-scene commanders require as much of a persuasive aptitude as command abilities.
A significant complicating effect may be the presence of non-military entities such as Private Voluntary Organizations attempting to provide parallel relief services. Private Voluntary Organizations (PVOs) as defined by USAID are tax-exempt, non-profit organizations working in international development that receive some portion of their annual revenue from the private sector and receive voluntary contributions of money, staff time, or in-kind support from the general public. While the term PVO ends to be a United States usage, the term NGO is used internationally and increasingly is the generic reference term for the community as a whole. As a result, NGOs are now increasingly assuming state-type functions, such as the provision of public services, in areas like health and education to an extent that was unimaginable a decade ago. 6 The cultural characteristics of NGOs often clash with the more traditional roles of intervening military organizations in a number of ways. In the first place, disaster relief services are a significant industry and tend to solicit media attention. Economically, eight disaster relief agencies control half of the $8 billion disaster relief market and media attention is one of the primary means used to request contributions from the public. 7 Research has shown that income increases significantly when purchased advertisements are combined with coverage of the PVOs work on national television and radio programs. 8 PVO desires for media coverage may conflict security concerns of on-scene commanders.
Secondly, NGOS are normally independent entities that tend to develop their own plans and programs. They are not accustomed to working with other organizations nor are they arranged along hierarchical lines like a military organization. Instead greater autonomy is given to individuals working in the field. Finally, NGOs are normally committed to a long-term presence in the region. In many cases aid workers may have been in place well before the introduction of military personnel and tend to work toward an end state instead of an exit strategy.
Perhaps the most unique aspect of a PVO is its apolitical stance. Most relief organizations gain access to nations based on the fact that they espouse no political affiliation and are viewed as a neutral form of assistance. However, military forces represent both the positive and negative perceptions of their parent country. As a result, some relief organizations may refuse to work with deployed military forces out of concern of losing their neutrality in the eyes of the host nation. 9 PVO criticism of military relief operations extend beyond the organizational differences cited above to include cultural differences. The military's concept of the final objective and the tools they have to reach that objective may be inadequate for the task at hand. For example, military engineers concentrate on the speed of the construction rather than permanence since they do not need roads and bridges to last for generations. On the other hand, United States involvement in humanitarian and disaster relief operations is almost certain to increase. As the sole remaining power with the military capability and economic resources to influence world events, the United States will be increasingly called upon to participate or lead international relief operations. It is probably safe to say that the military's focus has shifted from one of nuclear deterrence with a peripheral interest in regional conflicts, to a current focus that requires equal proficiency in operations short of war and major theater war.
With this background in mind I offer the following recommendations for continued AEF development.
Increase Emphasis on Humanitarian AEF Planning and Education
In forming the AEF, Air Force leaders are trying to make air power more responsive to national security leaders. To remain viable and useful in the future the Air Force needs to adapt to a world where the threat may not be a nation-state in search of territory, but a mass of people fleeing an epidemic or a tyrannical despot. In this environment proficiency at rapid and global humanitarian and peacekeeping operations will be as equally important as combat operations.
While the logistics demands of combat style AEFs are more challenging, humanitarian AEFs have their own unique challenges that the military is not fully prepared for. In these deployments, emphasis switches from bombs on target to providing fresh water, food, and medical care. Deployment packages that support a combat unit may not be adequate for these types of events. The overall benefit of this suggestion is that Air Force members would obtain a degree in something that is of use to the member in the field and is helpful in promoting the Expeditionary Air Force culture.
Look for Alternatives to Forward Presence Style AEFs
While the current AEF strategy involves deploying air power to a trouble spot in a rapid manner, the proliferation of ballistic missile, chemical, biological, and nuclear technologies to numerous third-world and non-state actors has created a new threat to this approach of forward deployment. By the turn of the century it is estimated that 20 countries will have roughly 12,000 short and medium range ballistic missiles. 1 Although nuclear technology is still a significant stretch for many non-state actors, crude chemical and biological weapons delivered by non-traditional means pose a danger to forwarddeployed forces.
AEFs need to include theater ballistic missile defensive systems in their planning.
Prepositioning Patriot units or deploying the future airborne laser should provide a nearterm capability, however, a more prudent long-term approach would be to re-look at our current acquisition strategy which is heavily slanted toward expensive and relatively short range fighters.
Long range bombers equipped with cruise missiles take advantage of the global reach and precision of air power while offering the enemy a fleeting opportunity to retaliate. In addition, they offer the option of conducting global strike missions from the United States or from in-theater locations removed from the front. The acquisition of future deep strike type platforms should emphasize long range and endurance bomber assets over shorter range fighters.
Reinvest in Strategic Airlift
Every discussion of AEF employment assumes airlift is an available commodity. By its very nature, an AEF cannot rely on slower surface transport for anything other than those materials that are in close proximity to the AEF location. However, the current airlift acquisition strategy places this assumption in doubt for two reasons.
First, while the Air Force is in the process of acquiring 120 C-17 type aircraft to replace the C-141 and augment the aging and increasingly unreliable C-5, this acquisition represents a decrease in overall airlift assets from Desert Storm. This creates a larger penalty on the airlift system when an aircraft breaks. In addition, C-17s will become the preferred lift option as they are specifically designed to provide a small "footprint" and decrease constraints as to the number of aircraft that can be handled at any one time. 2 As a result, demand will most likely far outstrip supply.
Second, AEF discussions do not include the impact of other services vying for airlift assets in a contingency. While some airpower advocates might view air power as singlehandedly prevailing in a contingency, in all likelihood Army and Marine assets would also be deployed, while naval assets would self-deploy. 
Rediscover Our Expeditionary Roots
The Air Force needs to instill an expeditionary mindset into its culture by Recent attempts at using the AEF to reduce ops tempo strains are laudable, but in the final analysis ops tempo will be driven by the uncertainties of the changing world and the American public's willingness to remain engaged in world events.
Notes
